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DEFINING APPROPRIATE CRITERIA FOR THE




The right to strike-organized workers' effort to exert eco-
nomic pressure on their employer as a last resort in the negotia-
tions process-is perhaps the most misunderstood principle of la-
bor relations.' However, organized labor's right to strike, though
sparingly used, historically has been the best guarantee that the
negotiation process remains effective.2 One early union activist ex-
pressed the importance of the strike: "[Tihe workers have come to
the conclusion that any betterment of their conditions will be se-
cured only through their own economic power, through industrial
strikes and other means which they are beginning to employ to at-
tain their desired results."3 Today, Montana public employee
union leaders continue to stress the importance of the strike in
bargaining with the state.' Just as the strike has been vital to the
success of organized labor throughout Montana's history, the in-
junction5 has been employers' most effective legal means to
counter the strike. Employers have long relied on labor injunctions
as an effective means for preventing the economic damage caused
by strikes.' Once granted almost summarily by courts,7 injunctions
* The author wishes to thank Professor William L. Corbett, School of Law, University
of Montana, for his helpful comments and suggestions.
1. This comment focuses on economic strikes by public employees-strikes to bring
economic pressure on employers to make gains in collective bargaining. Unfair labor practice
("ULP") strikes are called in response to an alleged unfair practice engaged in by the em-
ployer. Sympathy strikes result from employees' refusal to cross another union's picket line
or from one union calling a strike against the same employer in support of another union.
Both ULP and sympathy strikes are addressed only briefly in this comment.
2. 3ee, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, 29-30
(1930).
3. Letter from George Tompkins to U.S. Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin (Oct. 22,
1917), reprinted in JERRY W. CALVERT. THE GIBRALTAR. SOCIALISM AND LABOR IN BUTTE.
MONTANA. 1895-1920, at 111 (1988) (remarks of George Tompkins concerning the Metal
Mine Workers' strike of 1917).
4. See Tad Brooks, State Union Readies for Strike, THE BILLINGS GAZETTE, Mar. 2,
1989, at A5.
.5. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-101 (1991) states: "An injunction is an order requiring a
person to refrain from a particular act. The order may be granted by the court in which the
action is brought or by a judge thereof and, when made by a judge, be enforced as the order
of the court." The term "labor injunction" generally refers to an injunction used to postpone
or prevent a strike.
6. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 2, at 21.
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essentially eliminated organized labor's only means to force em-
ployers to negotiate in good faith and opened the door for more
aggressive means of breaking striking unions.8 As the legal accept-
ance of unions grew, and the notion that unions were illegal con-
spiracies lost merit, injunctions against picketing and strikes be-
came less routine.' Declaring that the right to strike was essential
to the balance of power in the negotiations process, Congress
passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932, limiting private sector
employers' ability to obtain federal court injunctions against
strikes. 10 Since then, several states also have passed little Norris-
LaGuardia Acts limiting the granting of injunctions against private
sector strikes except in situations of violence." These little Norris-
LaGuardia Acts generally do not apply to public employee
strikes.2
The modern-day strike in Montana is just as likely to involve
employees of state, county, or city governments ("public employ-
ees") 13 as employees in the private sector. Montana's largest un-
ions are now organizations of public employees. 4 The modern-day
7. See, e.g., id. at 21-23.
8. See, e.g., id. at 17-18.
9. See, e.g., Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed'n of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 275-77, 96 P.
127, 130-31 (1908).
10. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988)).
11. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 44-701 to -713 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 185.01 to .20 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 50-3-1 to -2 (Michie 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-08-01 to -14 (Michie 1987); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 662.010 to .130 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-19-1 to -13 (1988); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 49.32.011 to .110 (West 1990); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.51 to .62 (West 1988);
WYO. STAT. §§ 27-7-101 to -107 (1991).
12. See School Dist. No. 351 v. Oneida Educ. Ass'n, 567 P.2d 830, 833 (Idaho 1977);
City of Pana v. Crowe, 316 N.E.2d 513, 513 (Ill. 1974); School Comm'n v. Easton Teachers
Ass'n, 398 A.2d 1220, 1223 (Me. 1979); City of Albuquerque v. Campos, 525 P.2d 848, 853
(N.M. 1974); City of Minot v. General Drivers & Helpers Union No. 74, 142 N.W.2d 612, 617
(N.D. 1966); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen & Warehousemen's Union, 324
P.2d 1099, 1102 (Wash. 1958); Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Wisconsin Rapids Educ. Ass'n, 234
N.W.2d 289, 298 (Wis. 1976); Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyo., 531 P.2d 884,
888 (Wyo. 1975). But see Board of Educ. v. Public School Employees' Union Local No. 63,
45 N.W.2d 797, 802 (Minn. 1951) (holding that Minnesota's little Norris-LaGuardia Act ap-
plies to public employees generally).
13. The term "public employee" in this comment refers to an employee of a state
government or an employee of a political subdivision of a state government, such as a
county, city, or school board. This comment does not address issues relevant to federal gov-
ernment employees. Federal government employees and their unions are prohibited from
participating in any kind of work slow down or strike. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7116(b)(7)(A)-(B), 7311(3)
(1988). See, e.g, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.,
685 F.2d 547, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
14. The Montana Education Association is affiliated with the National Education As-
sociation and represents public school teachers and school support staff. The Montana Pub-
lic Employees Association is an independent state-wide organization and represents employ-
2
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strike in Montana commonly involves either teachers' 5 or state em-
ployees. 6 While the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the
Montana Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act to grant
public employees a right to strike,'7 the parameters of this right
are largely undefined.
This comment provides an overview of public employees' right
to strike in general and, more specifically, the source and scope of
this right in Montana. The approach to the strike injunction taken
in other states that recognize at least a limited right of public em-
ployees to strike is also discussed. Given this background, this
comment then attempts to define the appropriate parameters for
enjoining a public employee strike within Montana's statutory
context.
II. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO STRIKE
Unlike private sector employees, public employees are not cov-
ered by a uniform body of labor relations legislation."8 Public em-
ployees are specifically excluded from coverage under the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").' 9 Consequently, public employees'
rights to form unions, negotiate with their employers over condi-
tions of employment, and engage in strikes are left up to the legis-
lative and common law approaches of the individual states. At
common law, public employees generally have no inherent right to
participate in negotiations with government employers over any
terms or conditions of employment."0 Additionally, employees do
ees of state, county, and municipal governments and school and university support staff.
The Montana Federation of Teachers/Federation of State Employees is affiliated with the
American Federation of Teachers and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") and represents public school teachers, university faculty,
school support staff, and state employees. Additionally, traditional private sector unions,
such as the Teamsters, AFL-CIO, and the Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, now represent
public employees in Montana.
15. See, e.g., Steve Shirley, Few Teachers Cross Lines as Strike Begins, GREAT FALLS
TRIBUNE, Aug. 29, 1989, at Al.
16. See, e.g., Montana State Workers Strike Spreads as More Guard Troops Are
Sent In, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1991, § 1, at 12.
17. Department of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 354,
529 P.2d 785, 788 (1974).
18. The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988), and
the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988), cover most
private sector employees for the purpose of forming unions and collective bargaining with
employers.
19. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2)-(3) (1988).
20. See United Steelworkers v. University of Ala., 430 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (N.D. Ala.
1977); Beauboeuf v. Delgado College, 303 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D. La. 1969), aff'd per
curiam, 428 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1970); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. American Fed'n of
State, County and Mun. Employees, 200 A.2d 134, 138-39 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1964).
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not have a constitutional right to strike.21 Further, the United
States Supreme Court finds no merit in the argument that an em-
ployee's lack of power to withhold services for employment reasons
amounts to involuntary servitude. State courts also consistently
uphold restrictions on public employees' right to strike.23 Absent
specific state legislation, therefore, public employees and public
employee unions generally lack authority to demand the right to
bargain or exercise the right to strike.24 Courts, however, have up-
held as constitutional state legislation granting public employees
the right to strike.25
The traditional reason for prohibiting strikes by public em-
ployees is that the state refuses to relinquish its sovereign power
and duty to determine the conditions of employment for its em-
ployees.26 This argument concludes that allowing public 'employees
21. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926) ("Neither the common law, nor the
Fourteenth Amendment, confers the absolute right to strike."); United Steelworkers, 430 F.
Supp. at 1001 (holding that restrictions on the right to strike neither limit the First Amend-
ment rights of speech or association nor deny equal protection of the law); United Fed'n of
Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 882 (D.D.C. 1971) ("At common law no employee,
whether public or private, had a constitutional right to strike in concert with his fellow
workers."), afi'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971). Congress specifically granted private sector employees
the right to engage in "concerted activities," including strikes, under sections 7 and 13 of
the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (1988).
22. International Union, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
245, 251 (1949) (holding a Wisconsin statute which prohibited strikes does not violate the
Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude).
23. See City of New York v. De Lury, 243 N.E.2d 128, 131, 133 (N.Y. 1968) (neither
the First nor Fourteenth Amendment grants the right to strike, and equal protection argu-
ments are also not valid). See also City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 210 P.2d 305, 308 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Board of Trustees of Univ. of
Ky. v. Public Employee Council No. 51, 571 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Ky. 1978); City of Detroit v.
Division 26 of Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 51 N.W.2d
228, 232 (Mich. 1952); City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 131 A.2d 59, 61
(N.H. 1957); Passaic Township Bd. of Educ. v. Passaic Township Educ. Ass'n, 536 A.2d
1276, 1278 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1987); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 299
A.2d 441, 443 (R.I. 1973).
24. Nevertheless, public employees generally have the right to join or form unions re-
gardless of state authorization, based on freedom of association under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. See American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Wood-
ward, 406 F.2d 137, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288-89
(4th Cir. 1968). But cf. Wilton v. Mayor of Baltimore, 772 F.2d 88, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing the right of association may be limited by the legitimate government interest in mini-
mizing potential conflicts of interest in certain areas of public employment, like law enforce-
ment or fire protection). See generally Paul G. Reiter, Annotation, Right of Public
Employees to Form or Join a Labor Organization Affiliated With a Federation of Trade
Unions or Which Includes Private Employees, 40 A.L.R.3d 728 (1971 & Supp. 1991).
25. See Los Angeles Metro. Transit Auth. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 355 P.2d
905, 909 (Cal. 1960).
26. See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 83 A.2d 482, 485 (Conn. 1951);
City of Manchester, 131 A.2d at 61-62; New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. American Fed'n of
State, County, & Mun. Employees, 200 A.2d 134, 138 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1964); City of
4
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the right to strike wrests control of political and public policy deci-
sions away from legislatures and elected public officials, thereby
resulting in a threat to the public welfare." More recently, some
authors and courts have argued that the public sector, unlike the
private sector, provides services for the public benefit rather than
for profit. Because these services are not generally available
through private competition, consumers risk losing publicly pro-
vided services in the face of a strike. 8 Because public employers
and managers do not face the threat of traditional market pres-
sures, such as risk of losing business to competitors during a strike,
public sector strikes fail to encourage settlement between the
parties.29
Nevertheless, diverse opinion exists concerning the propriety
of public employee strikes. Proponents of allowing public employ-
ees the right to strike argue that without the ability to strike, pub-
lic employee unions lack not only their most effective tool to keep
the negotiation process meaningful, but negotiation disputes actu-
ally become more difficult to resolve. 30 The California Supreme
Court denounced as "factually insupportable" the typical argu-
ments that public employee strikes result in improper delegation
of legislative authority and always encompass essential public ser-
vices. 3' In addition, one author points out that no real correlation
exists between states providing the right to strike and an increased
number of public employee strikes. 32 In fact, public employee
strikes still occur most often in those states where they are ex-
pressly prohibited.3 This remains true even in the face of stiff
sanctions for supporters of illegal strikes.34
Alcoa v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 760, 308 S.W.2d 476, 479-80 (Tenn.
1964).
27. See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n, 83 A.2d at 485; Robert E. Doherty, Public Policy
and the Right to Strike, in THE EVOLVING PROCESS-COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT 283-84 (Jerome Lefkowitz ed., 1985).
28. See City of Rockford v. Local 413, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 240 N.E.2d 705, 706
(Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Arvid Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employ-
ment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943, 956-60 (1969).
29. See Doherty, supra note 27, at 283.
30. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n, 699 P.2d
835, 847-49 (Cal. 1985); Theodore W. Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 931, 941-42 (1969).
31. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2, 699 P.2d at 844-45.
32. Doherty, supra note 27, at 289.
33. See County Sanitation Dist. No. 2, 699 P.2d at 846-47; Doherty, supra note 27, at
289.
34. See, e.g., Rankin v. Shanker, 242 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1968); In Re Contempt of
White, 395 N.E.2d 499 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (case decided prior to passage of the Ohio
public employee collective bargaining act which now grants a right to strike).
19921
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It is impossible to generalize the structure or scope of the state
statutes that establish public employee collective bargaining and,
in many cases, grant or deny the right to strike. Each state public
employee collective bargaining act differs as to employees covered,
scope of bargaining, and methods for resolving impasse 35 in the ne-
gotiation process. In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to en-
act legislation providing for collective bargaining for public em-
ployees.36 Since then forty states have enacted legislation allowing
some form of collective bargaining for certain groups of public em-
ployees7.3  Twelve of these states-Alaska, California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, and Wisconsin-grant various groups of public employ-
ees at least a limited right to strike under state collective bargain-
ing laws.38 While no state grants public employees an unlimited
right to strike, public employees in Alaska and Montana have per-
haps the broadest right to strike. 39 The remaining states that have
public employee collective bargaining statutes specifically prohibit
strikes, providing instead for some form of alternative dispute res-
olution, such as mediation or binding arbitration.40 Alabama, Ari-
zona, Arkansas, Colorado, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Car-
olina, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia do not have collective
bargaining statutes for any group of public employees.
III. THE MONTANA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ACT AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
A. The Montana Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act
and Impasse Resolution
The Montana Legislature enacted the Montana Public Em-
35. "Impasse" is used throughout the Montana Public Employees Collective Bargain-
ing Act ("Montana Act") and describes the situation in collective bargaining where both
management and labor are deadlocked and unable to resolve one or more issues. See Walter
J. Gershenfeld, Public Employee Unionization-An Overview, in THE EVOLVING PRO-
CEss-COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLic EMPLOYMENT 16-17 (Jerome Lefkowitz ed., 1985).
36. Wisconsin Municipal Employment Relations Act, 1959 Wis. Laws 509, § 1.
37. See generally 1 Pub. Employee Bargaining (CCH) 401-451 (1990).
38. See infra note 134. The California public employees' right to strike is not granted.
by statute. The California Supreme Court has granted public employees the right to strike,
rejecting the traditional common law rule that public employee strikes are illegal. See
Countyv Sanitation Dist. No. 2, 699 P.2d at 849-50.
39. Doherty, supra note 27, at 283. See also infra, notes 122, 135, and accompanying
text.
40. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4333(c)(5) (1989) (prohibiting strikes); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-4332 (1989) (providing mediation, fact-finding, and binding arbitration for all bar-
gaining disputes); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.120 (West 1991) (prohibiting strikes);
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ployees Collective Bargaining Act4" ("Montana Act") in 1974. The
Montana Act is patterned after the NLRA. One author notes that
the Montana Act contains more provisions similar to the NLRA
than any other public employee collective bargaining act.42 The
Montana Act was amended to include the university system in
1974 and public schools in 1975.' 3
The Montana Act is now comprehensive in' its coverage of
public employees, including those employed by "the state of Mon-
tana or any political subdivision thereof, including but not limited
to any town, city, county, district, school board, board of regents,
public and quasi-public corporation, housing authority or other au-
thority established by law . . . .-i4 The only employees excluded
from the Montana Act are elected officials and governor appoin-
tees; supervisory, managerial, or confidential personnel; state board
or commission members; school district clerks and administrators;
registered professional nurses employed at health care facilities;
and professional engineers or engineers-in-training. 5
The Montana Act provides a comprehensive structure for es-
tablishing the collective bargaining process, providing impasse res-
olution procedures, and recognizing union rights as well as em-
ployer rights.' Additionally, the Montana Act provides the Board of
Personnel Appeals"a ("BPA") with authority to adopt rules to ad-
minister the Act. 47 The BPA also has primary jurisdiction to en-
force the Act." If necessary, orders of the BPA are enforceable in
district court.49
The stated policy of the Montana Act is "to promote public
business by removing certain recognized sources of strife and un-
rest, [and to) encourage the practice and procedure of collective
41. MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 39-31-101 to -409 (1991).
42. Rona Pietrzak, Some Reflections on Mackay's Application to Legal Economic
Strikes in the Public Sector: An Analysis of State Collective Bargaining Statutes, 68 OR. L.
REV. 87, 131, n.258 (1989).
4:3. The following articles contain detailed discussions of the background of the Mon-
tana Act: William L. Corbett, Determining the Scope of Public Sector Collective Bargain-
ing: A New Look Via a Balancing Formula, 40 MONT..L. REV. 231 (1979); Emilie Loring,
Labor Relations Law in Montana, 39 MONT. L. REV. 33 (1978); Candace C. Fetscher, Com-
ment, Negotiating with the Public: Montana's Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act,
:36 MONT. L. REV. 80 (1975).
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-103(1) (1991).
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-103(2)(b) (1991). Nurses employed at health care facili-
ties are granted collective bargaining rights under the Collective Bargaining Act for Nurses.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-32-101 to -114 (1991).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-1705 (1991).
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-104 (1991).
48. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-403 (1991).
49. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-409 (1991).
1992]
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bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustment of all disputes between
public employers and their employees." 50 Public employees cov-
ered by the Montana Act are granted broad rights to engage in
concerted activities similar to those granted to private sector em-
ployees under the NLRA.15 "If, after a reasonable period of negoti-
ation" between the employer and union, the negotiations stall, or if
the parties cannot reach agreement prior to the existing agree-
ment's expiration date, the Montana Act. requires the parties to
submit the dispute to non-binding mediation.2 As an additional
step in resolving collective bargaining disputes, the parties may
voluntarily submit the dispute to non-binding fact-finding." The
Montana Act is supplemented by the Arbitration for Firefighters
Act ("Firefighters Act") covering firefighters employed by a public
employer. 54 The Montana Act does not provide any further guid-
ance for resolving potefitial strike situations once impasse is
reached and fact-finding is concluded.
B. Defining the Right to Strike: Department of Highways v.
Public Employees Craft Council
In 1974, the Montana Supreme Court interpreted the right of
public employees to engage in "concerted activities" under the
Montana Act when the Montana Department of Highways ("De-
partment") sought to enjoin a scheduled strike by its maintenance
employees. 5 The Department sought and received a temporary re-
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-101 (1991).
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 (1991) states:
Public employees shall have and shall be protected in the exercise of the right of
self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their oun choosing on questions of wages,
hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection free from interference, restraint, or coercion.
The italicized language is identical to that of section 7 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-307 (1991). Mediation involves a staff member of the
BPA acting as a neutral go-between to work with the parties to reach a mutually agreeable
solution to the dispute. See Gershenfeld, supra note 35, at 16-17. In practice, the parties
seek mediation at the point in negotiations where it serves the best strategic purpose. Rarely
is mediation sought when the existing collective bargaining agreement expires. Seeking me-
diation is frequently a matter of mutual agreement between the parties and is typically
requested only after serious negotiation difficulties, even though the language of the statute
states otherwise.
53. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-308, -309 (1991). Fact-finding involves a neutral party,
named by the BPA, who holds a hearing to receive evidence on the dispute and then issues
a report which is released to the public if the parties cannot resolve the dispute. See Ger-
shenfeld, supra note 35, at 16-17.
54. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-34-101 to -106 (1991).
55. Department of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 351,
8
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straining order in district court preventing the strike. However, the
district court granted the union's motion to dismiss after a show
cause hearing two months later.56 On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed the lower court's order dismissing the request for an in-
junction and dissolving the temporary restraining order." The su-
preme court considered the language of the Montana Act that
grants the right to engage in "concerted activities""8 with regard to
federal cases interpreting the NLRA because the language in both
acts is nearly identical.5 9 Reasoning that "concerted activities" has
consistently included the right to strike since the term was first
used in 1932, the court concluded that the legislature intended
that the Montana Act be similarly interpreted. 0 The court thus
determined that the Montana Act grants public employees the
right to strike.' Such a judicial interpretation of legislative action
concerning the right of public employees to strike is not unique to
Montana.2
The Montana Supreme Court did not address the Depart-
ment's arguments that the strike by highway employees would in-
529 P.2d 785. 786 (1974).
56. Id. at 351, 529 P.2d at 786.
57. Id. at 355, 529 P.2d at 788.
58. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 (1991) (formerly codified at REV. CODES MONT. § 59-
1603(1) (Supp. 1977)). See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
59. Department of Highways, 165 Mont. at 351-52, 529 P.2d at 786. The Montana
Supreme Court has consistently looked to NLRB and federal court interpretations of the
NLRA for guidance in interpreting the Montana Act. See City of Great Falls v. Young, 211
Mont. 13, 17, 686 P.2d 185, 187 (1984); Small v. McRae, 200 Mont. 497, 502, 651 P.2d 982,
985 (1982); Teamsters Local 45 v. State ex rel. Bd. of Personnel Appeals, 195 Mont. 272,
276, 635 P.2d 1310, 1312 (1981); State ex rel. Bd. of Personnel Appeals v. District Court, 183
Mont. 223, 225, 598 P.2d 1117, 1118 (1979).
60. Department of Highways, 165 Mont. at 352-54, 529 P.2d at 786-87. See also Amal-
gamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 389 (1951) (the right to strike is an example of "concerted activi-
ties"); Los Angeles Metro. Transit Auth. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 355 P.2d 905,
906-07 (Cal. 1960) ("concerted activities" has commonly meant the right to engage in peace-
ful strikes to give force to union demands concerning working conditions).
61. Department of Highways, 165 Mont. at 354, 529 P.2d at 786-87. One author incor-
rectly characterizes the Department of Highways decision as creating a common law public
employee right to strike. See Tim Schooley, Comment, The Reinstatement Rights of Strik-
ing Public Employees, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 283, 290-91 (1987).
62. See Los Angelos Metro. Transit Auth., 355 P.2d at 906-10 (construing statute
which granted transit employees right to engage in concerted activities as granting the right
to strike); Local 1494, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 586 P.2d 1346,
1355-56 (Idaho 1978) (construing the collective bargaining act for firefighters to grant the
right to strike once collective bargaining agreement expires); Board of Educ. v. Public
School Employees' Union, 45 N.W.2d 797, 801-02 (Minn. 1951) (construing Minnesota's lit-
tle Norris-LaGuardia Act to prevent enjoining strikes by public employees in general be-
cause it specifically excluded other public employees-police, firefighters, or any public offi-
cials charged with duties involved with public safety-from its coverage).
9
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jure the health, safety, and welfare of the public,6 3 the most com-
monly recognized ground for enjoining otherwise legal strikes by
public employees."' The court simply ruled that the strike was le-
gal and, therefore, not enjoinable.6 5 The Montana Supreme Court
has not directly ruled on whether an otherwise legal strike by pub-
lic employees may be enjoined.
C. Limits to the Public Employee Right to Strike Under
Montana Law
The Montana public employees' right to strike is limited, both
in terms of the type of public employee involved and in terms of
other self-imposed limits via the collective bargaining process.
Montana law specifically limits firefighters' and nurses' right to
strike. Firefighters are covered by the Montana Act and the
Firefighters Act.6 6 The Firefighters Act provides for final and bind-
ing arbitration to resolve all bargaining disputes that reach im-
passe67 and specifically limits strikes by firefighters.6  In effect, the
Firefighters Act prescribes binding arbitration for all disputes that
cannot be resolved through any other means, such as mediation or
fact finding, provided for under the Montana Act 9 and prohibits
all strikes by firefighters.70
Registered nurses and licensed practical nurses employed at
private' or public health care facilities72 are covered by the Collec-
tive Bargaining for Nurses Act ("Nurses Act").73 Like the Montana.
Act, the Nurses Act provides for collective bargaining and em-
ployee and employer rights. The Nurses Act, however, clearly de-
fines 7' and limits75 strikes. The Montana Act leaves these issues
63. Department of Highways, 165 Mont. at 351, 529 P.2d at 786.
64. See infra note 138.
65. Department of Highways, 165 Mont. at 355, 529 P.2d at 788.
66. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-34-101 to -106 (1991).
67. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-34-101 (1991).
68. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-34-105 (1991) states: "Strikes are prohibited during the
term of any contract and the negotiations or arbitration of that contract."
69. See supra notes 52-53.
70. Notwithstanding the language of MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-34-105 (1991), which
states that strikes are limited, the statute actually prohibits strikes during all possible
phases of bargaining and impasse in which they could occur.
71. The Nurses Act regulation of private sector nurses is preempted by the NLRA.
See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
72. See MONT.'CODE ANN. §§ 39-32-102(3), (4) (1991).
73. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-32-101 to -114 (1991).
74. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-32-102(5)'(1991) defines a strike as "any work stoppage
caused by the employees of a health care facility . . . that interferes with the operation of
the health care facility or affects the care of patients .... .
75. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-32-110 (1991) states:
10
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open to interpretation. While recognizing the right of nurses to
strike, the Nurses Act requires that a union send written notice to
a health care facility thirty days prior to any strike." Additionally,
the Nurses Act prohibits a strike if another strike is in progress
within a 150-mile radius of that health care facility." The balanc-
ing of interests between employees' rights and public welfare is re-
flected in the Nurses Act's purpose of ensuring "uninterrupted
continuation of sufficient competent nursing care of the ill and in-
firm in the state . . . ." In addition to the statutory controls on
firefighters' and nurses' right to strike, three other limits can be
applied to all public employees' right to strike through the collec-
tive bargaining process.
1. The Notice Provision
The first possible limit on the right to strike is a notice provi-
sion in the collective bargaining agreement between the public em-
ployer and the union. The notice provision is binding and enforce-
able as part of the collective bargaining agreement. 79 A notice
provision appears in the contract between the State of Montana
and employees of the women's prison.80 The purpose behind a no-
tice provision is to ensure adequate time to replace the vital ser-
vices that are lost during a strike.8 ' As such, the contractual notice
provision has the same effect as the mandatory notice required
under the Nurses Act. If a union chose to strike without giving the
required notice, the strike would be in violation of the collective
It shall be unlawful for any employee of a health care facility ... to participate in
a strike if there is another strike in effect at another health care facility within a
radius of 150 miles. Employees of a health care facility .. .or their duly elected
representative must give the health care facility 30 days' written notice of any
strike by them and must specify in the notice the day the strike is to begin.
76. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-32-110 (1991).
77. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-32-110 (1991).
78. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-32-101 (1991).
79. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-306(3), -406, -409 (1991).
80. The notice provision in the contract for employees at the Women's Correctional
Center states: "The Federation shall give the employer advance notice of not less than 24
hours before any concerted action may begin." Women's Correctional Center Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement between the Department of Corrections and Human Services and Mon-
tana Federation of State Employees (1991-93), art. 19, § 2 at 20.
81. Historically, the Montana National Guard has been used at the state prison and
state hospitals to replace the services of striking workers. See, e.g., Montana State Workers
Strike Spreads as More Guard Troops Are Sent In, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1991, § 1, at 12
(reporting that 700 Montana National Guard troops were ready to replace workers at state
institutions in the event of a strike); Strike Permeates Life in Montana, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 1991, at A10 ("National Guardsmen were called to work in the state's prisons and some
institutions for the elderly or handicapped.").
1992]
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bargaining agreement, constituting an unfair labor practice enjoin-
able by the BPA under the Act 2
2. The No-Strike Clause
The second voluntary limit on the ability to strike is the "no-
strike clause" that, if included in the collective bargaining agree-
ment, is enforceable as part of the collective bargaining agreement.
No-strike clause language varies, but is generally an agreement be-
tween the employer and the union not to engage in any work stop-
page during the term of the agreement.83 The rationale behind the
no-strike clause is that because labor and management have mutu-
ally agreed on a collective bargaining agreement for a specific term
that provides for binding arbitration to resolve grievance disputes,
no need to strike exists because the contract is enforceable through
the arbitration procedure.8 4 The no-strike clause is generally re-
garded as management's quid pro quo for agreeing to submit griev-
ances to binding arbitration. 5 No-strike clauses are common in
public employee collective bargaining agreements. An economic
strike during the term of a contract containing a no-strike clause
and grievance arbitration is generally illegal and enjoinable8 6
3. Interest-Arbitration
The third possible limit on the public employee strike, volun-
tary interest-arbitration," is a complete alternative to the strike.
The Montana Act provides that nothing contained in the dispute
82. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-306(3), -406, -409 (1991). See also Savage Public
Schools v. Savage Educ. Ass'n, 199 Mont. 39, 43-44, 647 P.2d 833, 835 (1982) (refusal to
comply with provision in collective bargaining agreement requiring arbitration constitutes
both a breach of the contract and an unfair labor practice).
83. An example of a no-strike provision in a state collective bargaining agreement
states: "There shall be no strikes, slowdowns or work stoppages of any kind for any reason
on the part of [the] union or employees during the term of this agreement, nor shall there
be any lockout of employees during the term of this agreement." Collective Bargaining
Agreement between Montana Board of Regents of Higher Education and the Vocational
Technical Educators of Montana 4610, MFT, AFL-CIO (1991-93), art. 11.8 at 28.
84. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
85. Id. at 248. The inclusion of an arbitration provision in the collective bargaining
agreement implies a waiver of the right to strike over matters which the parties have agreed
to submit to arbitration-even where a no-strike clause is not included in the collective
bargaining agreement. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-05
(1962).
86. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279-84 (1956); Arlan's Dep't
Store of Michigan Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 802, 808 (1961). See also supra note 82.
87. Interest-arbitration involves submitting the collective bargaining dispute to an ar-
bitrator who makes a final and binding decision resolving the dispute. See Gershenfeld,
supra note 35, at 17-18.
[Vol. 53
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resolution provisions prohibits the parties from agreeing to final
and binding arbitration to resolve bargaining disputes that reach
impasse.8 8 Any interest-arbitration agreement between the public
employer and the union supersedes the fact-finding step of the
Montana Act89 and is enforceable under the Act.90 Binding inter-
est-arbitration for collective bargaining disputes is an issue of great
controversy in Montana among labor organizations and manage-
ment associations.9 Nevertheless, on several different occasions,
the Montana Legislature has rejected amendments to the Montana
Act that would require mandatory binding interest-arbitration of
unresolved collective bargaining disputes in lieu of a right to strike
for certain groups of employees.2 Unions and public employers are
free to include final and binding interest-arbitration provisions in
collective bargaining agreements. A strike in violation of a contract
provision requiring final and binding interest-arbitration of collec-
tive bargaining disputes, like those where notice requirements and
no-strike clauses are in effect, would be an unfair labor practice
under the Montana Act and enjoinable9 3 Any public employee
strike in violation of the Montana Act may be enjoined under the
Montana Act.
IV. SEEKING THE LABOR INJUNCTION UNDER THE MONTANA
INJUNCTION STATUTES
Montana does not have a little Norris-LaGuardia Act covering
labor injunctions,9 nor does the Montana Act specifically provide
88. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-310 (1991).
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-310 (1991). The court has interpreted section 39-31-310
as neither requiring nor prohibiting public employers from agreeing to submit negotiation
disputes to final and binding arbitration. Young v. City of Great Falls, 198 Mont. 349, 354,
646 P.2d 512, 515 (1982).
90. See supra note 79.
91. The Montana AFL-CIO, the Montana Federation of Teachers, and the Montana
School Boards Association are opposed to amending the Montana Act to provide for
mandatory and binding arbitration of collective bargaining disputes. See Transcript of
Hearings on H.B. 619 Before the House Education and Cultural Resources Committee, 52d
Leg. (Feb. 20, 1991) at 10. On the other hand, the Montana Education Association advocates
adding a final and binding arbitration provision for school employees to the Montana Act.
See id. at 9.
92. See H.B. 619, 52d Leg., 1991 House and Senate Journal Index at 2348 (arbitration
for school employees); S.B. 343, 51st Leg., 1989 House and Senate Journal Index at 70 (arbi-
tration for municipal police officers); S.B. 343, 50th Leg., 1987 House and Senate Journal
Index at 66 (arbitration for school district employees); H.B. 503, 49th Leg., 1985 House and
Senate Journal Index at 197 (arbitration for school district employees); S.B. 92, 48th Leg.,
1983 House and Senate Journal Index at 16 (arbitration for strikes endangering public
services).
93. See supra note 82.
94. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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for the granting of injunctions to prevent otherwise legal public
employee strikes. Therefore, a public employer seeking to enjoin a
public employee strike not in violation of the Montana Act must
do so under Montana's general injunction statutes." The Montana
injunction statutes apply when the public employer seeks to enjoin
a strike because the strike violates some other right even though it
is legal under the Montana Act. 6
An employer seeking to enjoin a strike must first file a com-
plaint and motion for temporary restraining order in state district
court.9 7 The district court can then issue a temporary restraining
order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction
should not be issued.98 After the hearing to show cause, the district
court either will issue or dissolve the temporary restraining order,
depending on the court's findings under section 27-19-201-the
heart of the injunction statutes.9
The only reference to the labor injunction under the injunc-
tion statutes is found in section 27-19-103(8), which states that a
court may not issue an injunction in a labor dispute under differ-
ent circumstances than it would if the injunction involved a dis-
pute of a different nature.100 In 1917, the Montana Supreme Court
95. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-19-101 to -406 (1991).
96. The possibility of courts granting labor injunctions under section 27-19-201 has
serious implications for Montana public employees' established legal right to strike. This is
clear given the protection of the right to strike under the Montana Act and the importance
public employee unions place on the right to strike. The granting of labor injunctions tradi-
tionally involves a careful weighing of the rights at stake and clear evidence that the strike
involves some illegal activity before injunctive relief is granted. See infra note 173 and ac-
companying text (criteria for injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
97. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-314 (1991).
98. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-301 (1991).
99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-201 (1991) (modeled after CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 526)
states:
An injunction order may be granted in the following cases:
(1) when it shall appear that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded
and such relief or any part thereof consists in restraining the commission or con-
tinuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(2) when it shall appear that the commission or continuance of some act dur-
ing the litigation would produce a great or irreparable injury to the applicant;
(3) when it shall appear during the litigation that the adverse party is doing
or threatens or is about to do or is procuring or suffering to be done some act in
violation of the applicant's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending
to render the judgment ineffectual;
(4) when it appears that the adverse party, during the pendency of the action,
threatens or is about to remove or dispose of his property with intent to defraud
the applicant, an injunction order may be granted to restrain the removal or
disposition;
(5) when it appears the applicant has suffered or may suffer physical abuse
under the provisions of 40-4-121.
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-103(8) (1991) (modeled after CAL. Civ. CODE § 3423;
14
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recognized this section as a legislative response to the tendency of
courts to grant injunctions against labor unions when the require-
ments for an injunction clearly were not met.' However, the court
also noted that the provision adds nothing substantive to the law
because all injunctions under the statute must meet the same
criteria."0 2
Additionally, section 27-19-103(4) states that an injunction
may not be granted "to prevent the execution of a public statute
by officers of the law for the public benefit."'03 To overcome sec-
tion 27-19-103(4)'s prohibition against issuing an injunction to pre-
vent the execution of a public law, the complainant must show ei-
ther irreparable injury or violation of a constitutional right.' In
the case of a public employee economic strike, the employer is
seeking to enjoin the union from engaging in a legal activity, pro-
tected by the Montana Act. The court, therefore, must determine
whether some other substantial right outweighs the public employ-
ees' legislatively granted right to strike." 5
A 1991 proposed amendment to section 27-19-103 would have
added a new subsection stating that an injunction may not be
granted:
to restrain union members on strike from participating in an ac-
tivity protected by the Constitution of the United States of
America or the Constitution of the state of Montana unless a
court makes a finding and establishes, pursuant to 27-19-201, that
the injunction is necessary to prevent violence or irreparable in-
jury to property.'0
Even though the amendment failed to pass,' 7 the proposed change
merely states well-settled law.' 8 Like subsection (8), the proposed
however, subsection (8) is unique to the Montana statute).
101. Empire Theater Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 194, 163 P. 107, 110 (1917).
102. Id.
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-103(4) (1991).
104. See New Club Carlin, Inc. v. City of Billings, 237 Mont. 194, 196, 772 P.2d 303,
305 (1989).
105. See Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 546
P.2d 687, 692-93 (Cal. 1976) (Agricultural Labor Relations Act authorized administrative
regulations that granted union organizers qualified access to growers' property for the pur-
pose of assisting employees in exercising their rights of concerted activities under the act).
In construing a statute identical to section 27-19-103(4), the California Supreme Court held
that employers were not entitled to an injunction to prevent enforcement of the valid regu-
lation, regardless of their assertion that the regulation infringed on their property rights.
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 546 P.2d at 692-93.
106. S.B. 75, 52d Leg., 1991.
107. See S.B. 75, 52d Leg., 1991 House and Senate Journal Index at 2153.
108. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Local of Great Falls Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Ma-
chinists No. 287, 283 F. 557, 563-64 (D.C. Mont. 1922); Empire Theater Co., 53 Mont. 183,
1992]
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language was intended to emphasize the traditional protection for
peaceful union concerted activities." 9
Under section 27-19-201, a court considering a labor injunc-
tion would likely focus on whether: (1) the applicant is entitled to
the relief,"' (2) the continuation or commission of the act of the
adverse party (the strike) would produce a great or irreparable in-
jury to the applicant,"' or (3) the act (the strike) is or would be in
violation of the applicant's rights." 2 The individual subsections of
section 27-19-201 are disjunctive; therefore, the moving party need
only make a showing of any one subsection to have sufficient
grounds for an injunction." 3 Nevertheless, the bare claim that a
party may suffer irreparable injury must be accompanied by some
substantial right to relief by injunction, since injunctive relief is
not an absolute right."" In addition, where money damages are
sufficient to compensate for the asserted injury, there is no irrepa-
rable injury." 5 As discussed below in Part VI, Section B4, the most
probable use for the Montana injunction statutes is enjoining ille-
gal activities, such as violence or mass picketing, that may accom-
pany an otherwise legal strike." 6
V. COMPARISON OF THE MONTANA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ACT WITH OTHER STATES' ACTS
Each of the eleven state collective bargaining acts that provide
various classifications of public employees a right to strike under
certain circumstances is fairly unique. However, these acts share
important traits which illustrate a common concern-providing for
the right to strike while balancing the interest of effectively deliv-
ering public services." 7
191-92, 163 P. 107, 109-10; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed'n of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 275, 96
P. 127, 130-31 (1908).
109. Interview with Thomas Towe, State Senator from Billings, in Missoula, Mont.
(May 1, 1992)..
110. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-201(1) (1991).
111. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-201(2) (1991).
112. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-201(3) (1991).
113. Stark v. Borner, 226 Mont. 356, 359-60, 735 P.2d 314, 317 (1987).
114. See Intermountain Deaconess Home for Children v. Montana Dep't of Labor &
Indus., 191 Mont. 309, 314, 623 P.2d 1384, 1387 (1981); Holtz v. Babcock, 143 Mont. 341,
356, 389 P.2d 869, 876 (1964).
115. New Club Carlin, Inc., 237 Mont. at 196-97, 772 P.2d at 305.
116. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
117. The following articles offer detailed comparative analyses of the 11 state collec-
tive bargaining acts that grant public employees a right to strike: Rona Pietrzak, Some Re-
flections on Mackay's Application to Legal Economic Strikes in the Public Sector: An
Analysis of State Collective Bargaining Statutes, 68 OR. L. REv. 87 (1989); Benjamin Aaron,
Unfair Labor Practices and the Right to Strike in the Public Sector: Has the National
[Vol. 53
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Each state's collective bargaining act differs as to the public
employees covered and the rights each classification of employee is
granted. The acts of Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, Oregon,
and Pennsylvania are the most comprehensive in the number of
classifications of public employees covered under one collective
bargaining act." 8 The common theme among the eleven state acts
is that certain groups of employees provide services the state con-
siders so essential that these employees are expressly denied the
right to strike under any circumstances.' 9 However, no general
agreement among the states exists as to which classifications of
employees fit into this category. For example, some of the eleven
states prohibit strikes by firefighters, law enforcement employees,
teachers, and state employees; conversely, other states grant these
same groups the right to strike.'2 0 The Ohio Public Employees Col-
lective Bargaining Act identifies the greatest number of employees
as providing services that are too important to be allowed the right
Labor Relations Act Been a Good Model?, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (1986).
118. These state acts cover most state and municipal employees and university and
school district employees. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 89-2, 89-6 (1985 & S(Ipp. 1991); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 179A.03(14)-(15) (West Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-103(1)-(2)
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01(B)-(C) (Baldwin 1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§
243.650(17)-(18) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.301(1)-(2) (1991). The Alaska Em-
ployment Relations Act covers most of that state's employees with the exception of public
school teachers and employees. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.250(6)-(7) (1990). Similarly, the Illi-
nois Public Labor Relations Act covers most Illinois public employees, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, para. 1603(n)-(o) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992), except public school employees covered by
the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1702(b) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992).
119. Many state acts define essential employees. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(a)(1)
(1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-2 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT ch. 48 para. 1603(e) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.A03 subd. 7 (West Supp. 1992).
120. Alaska grants most state employees, except firefighters and law enforcement per-
sonnel, the right to strike. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.200(b)-(d) (1990). Teachers are excluded
under the Alaska Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act and are denied the right to
strike. See Anchorage Educ. Ass'n v. Anchorage School Dist., 648 P.2d 993, 996 (Alaska
1982). Idaho grants firefighters the right to strike. under the Idaho Employment of Firefight-
ers Act. See Local 1494, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 586 P.2d 1346,
1358 (Idaho 1978) (construing IDAHO CODE § 44-1811 (1977)). However, teachers are not
granted the right to strike in Idaho. See School Dist. No. 351 v. Oneida Educ. Ass'n, 567
P.2d 830, 833 (Idaho 1977). Minnesota grants state employees and teachers the right to
strike, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.18 (West Supp. 1992), but not firefighters or police, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 179A.18 subd. 1 (West Supp. 1992). Montana grants state employees, teachers,
and police the right to engage in "concerted activities" which includes the right to strike
under MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 (1991); however, firefighter strikes are prohibited,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-34-105 (1991). Vermont grants municipal employees, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1730 (1987), and teachers, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2010 (1989), the right to strike,
but not state employees, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 962(5) (1985). Wisconsin provides municipal
employees an opportunity to strike, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm)(5), (6)(c) (West 1988),
but not state employees, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.84(2)(e) (West 1988).
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to strike.121  The Alaska Public Employment Relations Act
("Alaska Act") divides all employees covered by the Act into three
classifications, depending on the relative importance of the services
the employees provide. 121
Like the Montana Act, the other ten state acts provide a sys-
tem for assisting the negotiation process and resolving bargaining
disputes. These procedures are designed to prevent impasses that
may lead to strikes and to regulate those strikes that do occur. Me-
diation is common in most of the states, and is usually required at
some point prior to impasse.12 The inclusion of some form of fact-
finding to help resolve bargaining disputes if mediation does not
work is also common. 24 The majority of the states requires both
parties to participate in either mediation or fact-finding proce-
dures as a prerequisite to a legal strike.'25 The Montana Act differs
in this respect in that it does not specifically state that a strike
cannot be called until the parties comply with the mediation and
fact-finding procedures in the Act. 2 6 This is probably not a signifi-
cant distinction, however, because unions and public employers
generally work through all available procedures in an attempt to
resolve disputes. As a practical matter, a union calls a strike only
121. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(1) (Baldwin 1990) (including police, firefight-
ers, highway patrol, sheriff, emergency medical, and correctional facility employees).
122. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(a)-(c) (1990) ("[Plolice and fire protection employ-
ees, jail, prison, and other correctional institution employees, and hospital employees" pro-
vide "services which may not be given up for even the shortest period of time" and are
prohibited from engaging in strikes. "[Plublic utility, snow removal, sanitation, and public
school and other educational institution employees" provide "services which may be inter-
rupted for a limited period but not for an indefinite period of time" and a strike may be
enjoined if it begins "to threaten the health, safety, or welfare of the public." The third class
of employees includes all other public employees who are considered to provide "services in
which work stoppages may be sustained for extended periods without serious effects on the
public.").
123. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.190 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(b)(1) (1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1612 (Smith-Hurd 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.18(1)(b) (West
Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-307 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(c)(2)
(Baldwin 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.712(1) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801 (1991);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1731 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2006 (1989); Wis STAT. ANN-
§ 111.70(4)(cm)(3) (West 1988).
124. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(b)(2) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 44-1805 (1977); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 1613 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-308 (1991);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(3) (Baldwin 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.722 (1991); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1732 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 2007 (1989).
125. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(c) (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-12(b)(1) (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 44-1805 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1617(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.18(1)(b) (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726(2)(a) (1991);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730(1) (1987); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm)(6) (West 1988).
126. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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after exhausting all other available means to settle a dispute.12 7
Other common provisions in the state collective bargaining
acts that grant the right to strike are those requiring that a union
give a certain amount of notice to the public employer prior to en-
gaging in a strike.128 The Montana Act does not require a union to
give notice prior to a strike. 9 Montana public employers, however,
may negotiate notice provisions in collective bargaining agreements
providing the same effect as the statutory provisions.'3
Voluntary arbitration procedures are also common among the
eleven state collective bargaining acts.3 These procedures allow
the parties to voluntarily agree to submit negotiation disputes to
binding arbitration in lieu of striking. Once this method of dispute
resolution is selected, the right to strike is effectively waived.1 32
Mandatory arbitration provisions are also uniformly present in the
collective bargaining acts for those employees under each act who
are specifically prohibited from striking. 133 Finally, once the varied
mediation, fact-finding, or notice provisions are complied with,
public employees not specifically prohibited from striking may ex-
ercise their right to strike under each of the eleven state acts. 34
127. Interview with Mike Dahlem, Staff Attorney, Montana Federation of Teachers/
Federation of State Employees, AFT, AFL-CIO, in Helena, Mont. (Mar. 27, 1992).
128. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-12(b)(4) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1617(a)(5)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT ANN. § 179A.18 subd. 3 (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV.
STAT. § 243.726(2)(c) (1991); WIs. STAT ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm)(6)(c) (West 1988).
129. The Nurses' Act, however, does require a union to give advance notice of a strike.
See supra note 75.
130. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
131. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(b)(3) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1617(3) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.16 subd. 1 (West Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-31-310 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(E) (Baldwin 1990); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 243.712(c) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.804 (1991); VT. STAT ANN. tit. 21, § 1733
(1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm)(6) (West 1988).
132. The tradeoff between the right to strike and the right to submit collective bar-
gaining disputes to binding interest-arbitration is well recognized. See, e.g., Alaska Pub.
Employees Ass'n v. City of Fairbanks, 753 P.2d 725, 727 (Alaska 1988) (holding that a union
cannot demand that a public employer proceed to binding arbitration; only those classifica-
tions of employees which are denied the right to strike have a right to binding arbitration);
St. Paul Professional Employees Ass'n v. City of St. Paul, 226 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Minn. 1975)
(under collective bargaining act for public employees, nonessential employees who are al-
lowed to strike may request the employer to submit to interest-arbitration; however, essen-
tial employees who are prohibited from striking may invoke interest-arbitration).
133. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(b) (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(d) (1985); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 1614 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.16 subd. 2
(West Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-34-101(2) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.14(D)(1) (Baldwin 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.7242 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.805 (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
134. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(c)-(d) (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-12(b) (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 44-1811 (1977) (firefighters) (construed to grant the right to strike in Local 1494 of
International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 586 P.2d 1346, 1358 (Idaho
19
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Nevertheless, the state collective bargaining acts, except those
of Alaska, Idaho, and Montana, 13 5 state specifically that an other-
wise legal strike136 may be enjoined under certain circumstances.
While specific procedures vary,137 the nine state acts that provide
for enjoining otherwise legal strikes uniformly state that the public
employer may seek an injunction by showing that the strike is a
clear and present danger to public health or safety.138 It is essen-
tial, however, to note that the interpretations of what constitutes
an imminent threat to public health or safety vary among the
states.
1 39
1978)); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1617 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (public employees); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1713 (Smith-Hurd 1986) (public school employees); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 179A.18 (West Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (Baldwin 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.1003 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2010 (1989) (teachers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1730 (1987) (municipal employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm)(5), (6)(c) (West 1988)
(municipal employees).
135. The Idaho Employment of Firefighters Act and the Montana Act are silent on
when an otherwise legal strike may be enjoined. While the Alaska Act provides that strikes
by class one and class two employees may be enjoined, ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(b)-(c)
(1990), the act specifically states that strikes by class three employees are permitted for an
indefinite period of time. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(a)(3) (1990).
136. An otherwise legal strike (1) is not in violation of the contract, (2) is called after
the contract term has expired, and (3) is called after compliance with all provisions of the
state act, such as dispute resolution and notice.
137. The nine state acts differ as to when an injunction may be sought. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(c) (1990) (injunction may be sought when a strike begins to
threaten public health or safety); ILL. ANN. STAT ch. 48, para. 1618 (Smith-Hurd 1986) (in-
junction may be sought when strike is about to occur or is in progress). The state acts also
differ as to what body may grant an injunction. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1991)
(employer applies to court for injunction); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-12 (c)(1) (1985) (employer
applies to labor relations board for injunction). The Wisconsin Municipal Employment Re-
lations Act is unique in that it allows "any citizen directly affected by such strike" to peti-
tion for an injunction. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(7m) (West 1988).
138. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(c) (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-12(c)(1) (1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1618(a) (Smith-Hurd 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1713
(Smith-Hurd 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN, § 4117.16 (Baldwin 1990); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 243.726(3)(a) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1730(3) (1987), tit. 16, § 2010 (1989); WInS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(7m)(b) (West 1988).
139. Each state court interprets the standard of clear and present danger to public
health or safety according to the legislative direction in the respective collective bargaining
acts. Pennsylvania defines the criteria quite broadly. See Jersey Shore Area School Dist. v.
Jersey Shore Educ. Ass'n, 548 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Penn. 1988) (the potential adverse effect on
student learning due to loss of school days during a teachers' strike is sufficient to meet the
clear and present danger standard under the Pennsylvania Act). See also David T. Fisfis,
Commenit, Enjoining a Teachers' Strike: The Difficulties in Defining the Clear and Present
Danger Standard, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 583 (1989). The Oregon Public Employee Collective Bar-
gaining Act specifically states that a threat to public health and safety "does not include an
economic or financial inconvenience to the public or the public employer that is normally
incident to a strike .... " OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726(6) (1991). The Ohio Public Employee
Collective Bargaining Act limits to 60 days the length of any injunction granted to prevent a
strike that constitutes an imminent threat to the public safety. Omo REV. CODE ANN.
20
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The significant structural theme throughout the nine state
acts that provide for enjoining an otherwise legal strike is provid-
ing for continued dispute resolution rather than simply stopping
the strike. In these acts, the same authority that grants the injunc-
tion is required to order the parties to participate in good faith
negotiations or negotiations with the assistance of a mediator or to
submit the dispute to binding arbitration.'4 ° These provisions rec-
ognize that the injunction effectively puts the union in a weakened
bargaining position at a time when both sides are at impasse.
Thus, these provisions attempt to equalize the process by requiring
some form of continued dispute resolution in lieu of the strike."" A
significant distinction between the Alaska, Montana, and Idaho
acts and the other state acts is the lack of provisions mandating
alternative dispute resolution when otherwise legal strikes are
enjoined.
The Idaho Supreme Court considered whether an otherwise le-
gal strike may be enjoined under the Idaho Employment of
Firefighters Act ("Idaho Act") in 1978.142 In Local 1494, Interna-
tional Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, the court ini-
tially considered whether a strike by firefighters employed by the
City of Coeur d'Alene was illegal under the Idaho Act.'43 The
firefighters' existing contract expired on December 31, 1976, and
they continued to work without a contract while negotiations with
the city were in progress.'44 The negotiations broke down, and the
parties reached an impasse on January 5, 1977. At this point, the
parties submitted the unresolved negotiation issues to fact-finding
as required by the Idaho Act. 45 On May 6, 1977, after the fact-
finding procedures proved inconclusive, the firefighters went on
strike, and the city discharged them for participating in an illegal
strike.'4
In reversing the district court's holding that the strike was
§ 4117.16(A) (Baldwin 1990).
140. See Alaska Stat. § 23.40.200(c) (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-12(c)(1) (1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1618(a) (Smith-Hurd 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.16(B)
(Baldwin 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726(3)(c) (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(7m)(b)
(West 1988).
141. See, e.g., Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. City of Fairbanks, 753 P.2d 725, 727
(Alaska 1988).
142. Local 1494, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 586 P.2d 1346
(Idaho 1978).
143. Id. at 1354.
144. Id. at 1347.
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prohibited under the Idaho Act,"4 7 the Idaho Supreme Court rea-
soned that the legislature intended, by its construction of section
44-1811 of the Act, either to recognize a right to strike after con-
tracts had expired or, at a minimum, to leave open the possibility
for the parties to negotiate a contract that permits a strike after
expiration. 4  The supreme court considered the legislature's re-
fusal to include an absolute ban on strikes in the statute, 49 as well
as the fact that the city negotiated a contract with the union that
contained a no-strike clause which specifically prohibited strikes
during the term of the contract. 50 The supreme court reasoned
that if firefighters could not strike once the contract expired and
they complied with the Idaho Act, in effect, firefighters would be
without any right to strike under the Idaho Act. The court rea-
soned that the legislature clearly did not intend this result.15' The
supreme court concluded that an otherwise legal strike is not en-
joinable under the Idaho Act, given the structure of the Act as a
whole and the way the State implemented the Act through
negotiations. 52
VI. ANALYZING APPROPRIATE CRITERIA FOR THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
STRIKE INJUNCTION IN MONTANA
A. The 1991 State Employee Strike Injunction
As the 52nd Session of the Montana Legislature came to a
close in the Spring of 1991, the State of Montana faced the
toughest negotiations in recent years with the unions representing
a majority of the state's 14,000 employees. Five thousand state em-
ployees were preparing to walk off their jobs in what would be the
largest public employee strike in the state's history.' Among
147. Id. at 1354.
148. Id. at 1356-57,
149. Id. at 1356. IDAHO CODE § 44-1811 (1977) states: "Strikes prohibited during con-
tract. Upon consummation and during the term of the written contract or agreement, no
firefighter shall strike or recognize a picket line of any labor organization while in perform-
ance of his official duties."
150. Local 1494, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 580 P.2d at 1357-58.
151. Id. at 1358.
152. Id. at 1357-58. While the supreme court did recognize that the strike involved in
the case was an ULP strike which involves somewhat broader protection than an economic
strike, the supreme court did not limit its holding to ULP strikes, but rather any strike after
the contract had expired. This usually means an economic strike. See id. at 1354-57. "In
that period of time after the old contract expires and before the new one is consummated,
[strikes] are not prohibited and the parties are free to negotiate one way or another depend-
ing on their relative economic strengths." Id. at 1357.
153. See Montana State Worker Strike Spreads as More Guard Troops Are Sent In,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1991, § 1, at 12.
[Vol. 53
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those readying for the strike were employees of the Department of
Institutions at the state mental hospital at Warm Springs; the
state prison at Deer Lodge; the women's prison at Warm Springs;
the Montana Developmental Center, the home for the mentally re-
tarded at Boulder; and the Montana Highway Patrol.154 The strike
was set for 5:00 p.m. on April 22, 1991.155
On April 22, the State petitioned the Lewis and Clark County
District Court for a temporary restraining order to prevent em-
ployees from striking at the state prisons, the state hospital at
Warm Springs, and the Montana Developmental Center. 15 6 The
State did not seek to enjoin the Highway Patrol from striking.'5 7
The State argued that the impending strike would cause irrepara-
ble injury to the patients and inmates of the institutions and
would prevent the State from meeting its statutory obligations.' 8
In its memorandum in support of the motion for injunction, the
State characterized the strike as the confrontation between the leg-
islatively granted right to strike and the overriding constitutional
rights of the patients and inmates in the institutions.159 The dis-
trict court granted the State's motion and entered a temporary re-
straining order on April 22, setting a hearing to show cause for
April 24.160
The district court dissolved the temporary restraining order
and denied the State's motion for a preliminary injunction of the
impending strike of Department of Institutions employees on April
24, 1991.1'" The court first recognized that the legislature placed no
restrictions on the right of these employees to strike under the
Montana Act, even though the legislature had done so for firefight-
ers and nurses.' 61 Second, the court noted that the State entered
into collective bargaining agreements with the unions that contem-
154. See Greg McCracken, Unions Fear a Strike if Pay Raise Bill Fails, BILLINGS
GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1991, at Al.
155. Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 6, State v. Montana
Fed'n of State Employees (Mont. Dist. Ct. Lewis & Clark County 1991) (No. CDV 91-681)
[hereinafter Complaint].
156. Complaint, supra note 155, at 1-4.
157. Memorandum in Support of Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show
Cause at 9-10, State v. Montana Fed'n of State Employees (Mont. Dist. Ct. Lewis & Clark
County 1991) (No. CDV 91- 681) [hereinafter Memorandum].
158. Complaint, supra note 155, at 7.
159. Id. at 2-3.
160. Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause at 1, State v. Montana
Fed'n of State Employees (Mont. Dist. Ct. Lewis & Clark County 1991) (No. CDV 91-681).
161. Partial Transcript of Court Proceedings Before Thomas C. Honzel at 4, State v.
Montana Fed'n of State Employees (Mont. Dist. Ct. Lewis & Clark County 1991) (No. CDV
91-681) [hereinafter Court Transcript].
162. Court Transcript, supra note 161, at 2.
1992] 339
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plated strikes after the expiration of the agreements.'13 Recogniz-
ing the well-established right of Montana public employees to
strike, the court found no ground to enjoin the strike.16 4
Nevertheless, the court expressed concern that the basic needs
of the patients be met at Warm Springs and the Montana Devel-
opmental Center. Stating that it was relying "more on humanita-
rian grounds than on legal grounds," the district court allowed the
temporary restraining order to run an additional day to give the
State time to make arrangements for replacements.'65 This case il-
lustrates the difficulty courts and employers may have in deter-
mining the possible limits to public employees' right to strike.
B. Appropriate Injunction Criteria
Defining appropriate limits to Montana public employees'
right to strike is difficult because of the lack of guidance provided
by the Montana Act. In considering the appropriateness of a strike
injunction, a court must consider the importance of the respective
rights at stake. The Montana Act places a fundamental importance
on public employees' right to engage in concerted activities such as
strikes, but does not indicate what limits may be imposed on this
right. Nevertheless, various well-established limits serve as a basis
for defining appropriate criteria for enjoining a public employee
strike. Analyzing judicial approaches to the labor injunction in
other jurisdictions is helpful; however, the labor injunction must
be viewed in the specific context of the Montana Act because of
the differing approaches of the several states in establishing and
prioritizing the collective bargaining rights of public employees. In
addition, criteria such as "imminent danger to the public health or
safety" are ambiguous given the varied degrees of importance the
different states place on certain public services. If the criteria are
not carefully defined, the Montana public employees' right to en-
gage in legal strikes could be limited beyond the intent of the
Montana Act in situations where public sentiment or political
pressure is strongly opposed to a strike.
The appropriate criteria for enjoining a public employee strike
under the Montana Act may be found in: (1) the treatment of in-
junctions under the NLRA, (2) the historical development of pub-
lic sector bargaining in Montana and public employers' implemen-
tation of the Act, (3) the structure of the Montana Act itself, and
163. Id. at 5.
164. Id. at 4, 6.
165. Id. at 4.
[Vol. 53
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(4) situations of violence or threats of violence that would meet the
test of irreparable harm under the Montana injunction statute.
1. The NLRA as a Model for Regulating Montana Public Em-
ployee Strikes
The NLRA has not been an influential model for regulating
strikes in public sector collective bargaining acts.' 6 Despite the
many similarities between the Montana Act and the NLRA, the
Montana Act is silent on matters concerning the regulation of pub-
lic employee strikes. Nevertheless, the structure of the Montana
Act, like that of the NLRA,16 7 contemplates allowing a brdad right
to engage in economic strikes as part of the negotiation process. In
addition, the Montana Supreme Court has consistently relied on
federal court and NLRB interpretations of the NLRA for guidance
in interpreting the Montana Act,"6 8 specifically with regard to the
right to strike.16 9 Therefore, Montana courts should look to the
NLRA and its body of case law for guidance, within the limits set
by the Montana Act, when determining limits to the Montana
public employee strike.
Under the NLRA, a union is generally free to engage in eco-
nomic strikes after complying with the notice and cooling off provi-
sions in section 8(d) of the Act.'70 Absent some illegal activity'71 or
breach of the collective bargaining agr'eement,1 7 economic strikes
will not be enjoinable. Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a federal
court may enjoin a strike only if certain specific criteria are met. In
pertinent part, the Norris-LaGuardia Act requires that there be a
threatened or actual illegal act that will result in substantial and
166. Benjamin Aaron, Unfair Labor Practices and the Right to Strike in the Public
Sector: Has the National Labor Relations Act Been a Good Model?, 38 STAN. L REV. 1097,
1118 (1986).
167. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 468
F.2d 1372, 1373-74 (5th Cir. 1972); Martin Hageland, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 460
F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1972).
168. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
169. Department of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 529
P.2d 785 (1974).
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1988).
171. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(8)(b)(4) (1988) (strikes that have a secondary purpose
or strikes aimed at influencing jurisdictional or work assignment disputes are illegal under
§ 8(b)(4) of the NLRA). Under § 10(l) of the NLRA, the NLRB must petition the federal
district court for an injunction pending a final determination if the NLRB finds reasonable
grounds to believe a strike is in violation of § 8(b)(4)(A), (B), (C), or (D). See 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(1) (1988).
172. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254
(1970) (strike over disputes the parties are contractually bound to submit to arbitration may
be enjoined in federal district court).
1992]
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irreparable injury to the complainant's property, that the com-
plainant will be damaged more by denial of the relief than the de-
fendant will be by granting the relief, that no adequate remedy at
law exists, and that the public officers charged with the duty to
protect the complainant's property are unable or unwilling to fur-
nish adequate protection.'73 Regardless of the strong protection for
exercising the right to strike, the NLRA has never protected strike
activities that involve seizing property or acts of violence.'74
Finally, under section 208 of the Labor Management Relations
Act ("LMRA"), a federal court may enjoin a strike if the strike
would affect the entire, or a substantial part of, an industry and
would "imperil the national health or safety." 1 5 In any event, an
injunction granted under section 208 may not last longer than
eighty days. 76 Section 208 has been a more influential model for
limiting strikes under state collective bargaining acts than any
other NLRA provisions. 7 7 The nine states that specifically provide
for enjoining an otherwise legal strike under their collective bar-
gaining acts use criteria similar to that of section 208.178 The
LMRA, however, contemplates strike situations that encompass
more serious situations than, for example, the loss of school days
due to a teachers' strike. 9 Further, the individual state courts
must define what constitutes an imminent threat to the public
health or safety under their respective state collective bargaining
acts. As previously discussed, no general agreement exists as to
what strike situations create a clear and present danger to the pub-
173. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). See generally United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Local 25, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 421 F. Supp. 452 (D. Mass. 1976) (good example of how a federal district
court will review the evidence and apply the facts to the Norris-LaGuardia Act to determine
if an injunction is appropriate). Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, illegal acts must be com-
mitted or threatened as the threshold requirement. Illegal acts are not a general reference to
anything considered illegal but, rather, violence, threats, intimidation, vandalism, breaches
of the peace, or other criminal acts. See Marine Transport Lines, Inc. v. International Org.
of Masters, 770 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Local
Lodge No. 721 v. Central Georgia Ry. Co., 229 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1956).
174. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255-56 (1939).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1988). See also 29 U.S.C. § 176-180 (1988).
176. See Seafarers Int'l Union v. United States, 304 F.2d 437, 444-45 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 924 (1962).
177. See Aaron, supra note 166, at 1109.
178. The collective bargaining acts in Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin state that an otherwise legal strike may be en-
joined if the strike poses a clear and present danger to the public health or safety. See supra
note 138.
179. See United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 40-42 (1959) (affirming
injunction of industry-wide steel workers' strike as a threat to national safety because of
impacts on the defense industry).
[Vol. 53
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lic health or safety. 8 ' Because the Montana Act lacks a provision
similar to section 208 of the LMRA, this part of the federal labor
law does not provide much guidance for limiting the public em-
ployee strike in Montana. The NLRA as a whole, however, and
specifically section 7, after which the Montana Act is patterned,
grants employees strong protection for the right to engage in un-
limited strikes. ' 81
2. Montana Public Employers' Recognition of a Broad Right to
Strike
Montana's rich labor history cannot be disregarded in analyz-
ing the importance and general acceptance of the strike as an eco-
nomic weapon of labor. Certainly this backdrop was present while
the legislature considered the Montana Act. The Montana Act
does not stand alone in illustrating the general understanding in
Montana that the possibility of a strike is a necessary part of the
bargaining process between employees and employers. ' 8
Montana was not only the home of early private sector union-
ism,181 but also the home of some of the nation's earliest public
employee efforts to organize or negotiate contracts with their pub-
lic employers. Both the Butte Teachers' Union '84 and the Univer-
sity Teachers' Union in Missoula '85 were active in organizing pub-
lic employees long before any legislative authorization. In 1935, the
Butte Teachers' Union negotiated its first contract, which con-
tained a salary schedule and recognition of the union. 86 In so do-
ing, the Butte Teachers' Union became one of the first teachers'
groups in the nation to negotiate a collective bargaining agree-
ment.'87 These historical developments in public employee collec-
tive bargaining most certainly set the stage for early acceptance of
180. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 51. Section 13 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988) states: "Noth-
ing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limita-
tions or qualifications on that right."
182. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-33-201 to -205 (1991) (regulating the use of profes-
sional strike breakers); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-1-1002 (1991) (forbidding Montana Highway
Patrol from intervening in labor disputes, strikes, or boycotts).
183. See CALVERT, supra note 3, at 4.
184. John Astle, BuTTE TEACHERS' UNION. FIRST 50 YEARS, 1934-1984, at 2 (1984).
185. Id. at 18 (University Teachers' Union Local 119 at the University of Montana was
first organized in 1919, becoming one of the first university locals in the American Federa-
tion of Teachers, AFL-CIO).
186. Id. at 7-9.
187. Id. at 14.
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unions and the possibility of strikes in Montana's public sector.' 8
The Montana Legislature recognized that several collective bar-
gaining agreements covering public employees pre-dated the Mon-
tana Act and included a grandfather clause that specifically pro-
tects these collective bargaining agreements.' 9
Today, Montana public employers actively recognize the right
of public employees to engage in unlimited economic strikes
through the negotiation process. Since passage of the Montana
Act, public employers have negotiated contracts with public em-
ployee unions that include various no-strike and notice provisions
aimed at regulating possible economic strikes.19 0 These agreements,
entered into under authority of the Montana Act, clearly acknowl-
edge that the Act establishes a broad right to strike once the con-
tract has expired and the parties reach impasse.19 1 In the case of
those state employee unions that rely on legislative appropriations
to fund negotiated agreements, many collective bargaining agree-
ments specifically allow economic strikes during the term of the
agreement.'92 In some instances, public employers even recognize
the right of employees to engage in sympathy strikes.' 3 Montana
public employers clearly understand the Montana Act provides
Montana public employees the right to engage in economic strikes,
limited only by the employees' desires and ability to sustain the
strike.
188. Pre-1973 Montana Supreme Court decisions also illustrate the early acceptance
of unions in the public sector prior to passage of the Montana Act. See Benson v. School
Dist. No. 1, 136 Mont. 77, 344 P.2d 117 (1959) (holding that union security clause in Butte
Teachers' Union contract was void for lack of legislative authority to enter into such agree-
ment, although not addressing the question of authority to bargain with a public employer);
City of Billings v. Billings Firefighters Local No. 521, 200 Mont. 421, 425, 651 P.2d 627, 629
(1982) (court notes that beginning in 1968, the city continuously recognized the firefighters'
union in negotiations).
189. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-109 (1991).
190. See supra notes 80 and 83.
191. Any other reasoning dilutes the meaning of notice and no-strike provisions. See
Local 1494, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 586 P.2d 1346, 1357-58
(Idaho 1978).
192. The contract covering Montana State Prison employees states: "The Federation
shall have the right to engage in concerted activity after December 31, 1992, for matters
pertaining to wages and benefits in the [fiscal year] 94-95 biennium." Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the State of Montana and the Federation of Montana State Prison Em-
ployees, Local 4700, MFSE, AFL-CIO (1991-93), art. 15, § 3 at 29.
193. The contract covering most employees at the Montana State Hospital states:
"Nothing in the above section will be construed to mean that an individual employee or
group of employees shall be compelled to cross a legally established picket line authorized in
accordance with the constitutions and by-laws of a recognized bargaining unit at Montana
State Hospital at Warm Springs." Agreement between the State of Montana and the Warm
Springs Independent Union, Local 5070, MFSE, AFL-CIO, Montana State Hospital (1991-
93), art. 5 at 3.
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3. Structure of the Montana Act as an Indication of the Scope
of the Public Employees' Right to Strike
The overall structure of the Montana Act is probably the best
indication that the legislature intended to grant public employees
a broad right to engage in economic strikes once collective bargain-
ing agreements expire. First, strikes that constitute a violation of
the Montana Act are clearly enjoinable,1'9 just as illegal strikes
under section 10 of the NLRA are enjoinable.195 In addition, the
Montana Legislature specifically limited the strike rights of two
specific classifications of employees (nurses and firefighters) that
the legislature regarded as delivering essential public services.
Other state acts similarly designate certain public employees as es-
sential. 9 ' Under the Firefighters Act, all strikes are prohibited for
firefighters, and collective bargaining disputes that reach impasse
are settled through binding arbitration. 197 Additionally, the Nurses
Act, while granting the right to strike, carefully regulates this right
in order to prevent the loss of essential health care services
through a sudden strike or through more than one strike occurring
within a small geographic area.198 Indeed, the legislature has iden-
tified those services it considers essential and in need of regulation
to prevent or mitigate the effects of a strike.
The legislature is aware of the possibility of limiting the scope
of or preventing otherwise legal strikes. Nevertheless, the legisla-
ture leaves the final dispute resolution process up to the parties,
depending on their relative strengths and desires, once the dispute
resolution provisions in the Montana Act have failed. While this
approach is more akin to the private sector model under the
NLRA,' 199 Alaska 00 and Idaho2"' take similar approaches for cer-
tain public employees. The Ohio Public Employees Collective Bar-
gaining Act also contemplates letting the process play out, depend-
ing on the desires and strengths of the respective parties.0 2
In the nineteen years since adoption of the Montana Act, the
legislature has not perceived the need to change the structure of
the Act. This is perhaps most evident with respect to Montana
194. See .supra notes 82, 86, 93, and accompanying text.
195. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1988). See supra note 171.
196. See supra note 119.
197. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-34-101(2), -105 (1991).
198. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-32-110 (1991).
199. See supra note 167.
200. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
202. OHIO REV: CODE ANN. § 4117.16(A) (Baldwin 1990) (providing that an injunction
of an otherwise legal strike can only stand for 60 days).
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public employees' right to strike. On several different occasions,
the legislature considered and rejected changing the character of
the Act by replacing the right to strike with provisions that require
mandatory interest-arbitration to resolve bargaining impasses for
certain classifications of employees."' Most notably, the legisla-
ture, even after the Montana Supreme Court decision in Depart-
ment of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council and subse-
quent experiences with several public employee strikes, rejected
proposals that would have expressly prohibited public employee
strikes under the Montana Act."04
A court that reads into the Montana Act and the Montana
injunction statutes grounds to enjoin an otherwise legal public em-
ployee strike where no special circumstances exist (discussed below
in subpart 4) runs the risk of contravening legislative policy. For
example, the nine state acts that specifically provide for enjoining
an otherwise legal strike provide some direction concerning the cir-
cumstances under which an otherwise legal strike may be en-
joined '05 and what the court or administrative board granting the
injunction is required to do to equalize the situation once a strike
is enjoined.0 6 The complete lack of these provisions in the Mon-
tana Act indicates the legislature did not foresee enjoining other-
wise legal economic strikes.
In support of an injunction, public employers may point to
court decisions of other states where the established bargaining
context is different and ask the court to enjoin a legal strike based
on this criteria.20 7 The problem with this reasoning is that the
Montana Act does not contain provisions similar to these state var-
iations. Under the Montana Act, arguments that a legal economic
strike may create a clear and present danger to the public health
or safety based on the interpretations of another state are
irrelevant.
The Montana Act is silent on limiting an otherwise legal strike
for employees other than firefighters or nurses in health care facili-
ties. Had the legislature intended to set limits on otherwise legal
203. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
204. S.B. 198, 47th Leg., 1981 House and Senate Journal Index at 35; H.B. 632, 46th
Leg., 1979 House and Senate Journal Index at 214.
205. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
207. In its Memorandum in Support of Injunction, the State of Montana argued that
the district court should consider the criteria of states such as Pennsylvania for granting an
injunction of the impending state employee strike of 1991. Memorandum in Support of In-
junction at 3, State v. Montana Fed'n of State Employees (Mont. Dist. Ct. Lewis & Clark
County 1991) (No. CDV 91-681).
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strikes, the legislature could have expanded the number of employ-
ees it considered essential, and further regulated their right to
strike. Additionally, the legislature could have adopted provisions
to specifically limit otherwise legal strikes for all public employees
where the strike poses a clear and present danger to the public
health or safety, as several other states have done. A district court
should not interpret the Montana Act's silence as an opportunity
to enjoin otherwise legal strikes free of some extraordinary circum-
stances. The legislature intended to grant public employees a
broad right to engage in economic strikes, fully understanding that
these strikes would be allowed to run their course depending on
the employees' economic strength and desires. The legislature has
had numerous opportunities to change the character of the Act but
has held to the original structure providing most employees with
the right to engage in unrestrained legal economic strikes.
4. Irreparable Injury as a Criterion for Enjoining a Public Em-
ployee Strike
The outer limits of the Montana public employees' right to
strike should be those situations where strike activity creates irrep-
arable injury under the Montana injunction statutes. Situations
that meet the test of irreparable injury will be few, however, given
that the legislature has granted public employees a broad right to
-strike. Even though any strike in the public sector will cause some
harm or inconvenience to the public, the legislature did not foresee
enjoining an otherwise legal strike under the Montana Act. There-
fore, the injunction statutes are useful only for those situations
where the legal rights of some other party outweigh the public em-
ployees' right to strike. For example, an otherwise legal economic
strike that becomes violent, creates property damage, or involves
mass picketing blocking a right-of-way or creating a hazard will be
enjoinable. 0 8 Even in these situations, only the illegal activity,
such as the trespass or the mass picketing, will be enjoined. 0 9 The
strike itself remains lawful.
A year after the Montana Supreme Court's decision in De-
partment of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council,210 the
court, in considering a lawful teachers' strike and the school
208. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Local 25, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 421 F.
Supp. 452, 459-60 (D. Mass 1976); J.B. Michael & Co. v. Iron Workers Local No. 782, 173 F.
Supp. 319, 326 (W.D. Ky. 1957); Lake Charles Stevedores v. Mayo, 20 F. Supp. 698, 702-03
(W.D. La. 1935).
209. See Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F.2d 948, 951 (3rd Cir. 1939).
210. 165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974).
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board's violation of the Montana Act for attempting to restrain
that right, noted, "Union activities that become violent and
threaten the public safety are not protected by the constitutional
right to free speech or provisions for collective bargaining."''
When strikes involve violence, threats of violence, or damage to
property, public employers will have grounds to seek an injunction
of the illegal activity under the Montana injunction statutes.212
When a lawful strike does not involve any illegal act, the strike
should not initially be enjoinable under the Montana injunction
statutes." 3 In 1991, the State argued that Department of Institu-
tions' patients' constitutional right to essential care outweighed the
public employees' right to strike.214 This argument overlooks the
State's ability to use National Guard troops to replace the striking
workers, including nurses, or to hire replacements from the job
market. In other words, the State is correct in arguing that the
constitutional rights of patients in state institutions take prece-
dence over the legislatively granted .right to strike; however, rea-
sonable alternatives exist during a strike to provide for the pa-
tients' essential needs.215 Enjoining a legal strike is not a
prerequisite to providing for these needs.
The Lewis and Clark County District Court correctly deter-
mined that no grounds existed to enjoin the threatened state em-
ployee strike in 1991.216 The district court intimated, however, that
at some point grounds might exist to enjoin the strike if the strike
became protracted.217 It is difficult to imagine what circumstances
might create grounds to enjoin a legal strike involving no illegal
activity,218 because a legal strike that becomes protracted should
not be enjoinable on these grounds alone.21 9
VII. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court's holding in Department of
211. Board of Trustees v. State ex rel. Bd. of Personnel Appeals, 185 Mont. 104, 109,
604 P.2d 778, 781 (1979) (citing Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Local Great Falls Lodge of Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists No. 287, 283 F. 557 (D. Mont. 1922)).
212. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-19-201(2) (1991).
213. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
214. See Memorandum, supra note 157, at 9-10.
215. See supra note 81.
216. Court Transcript, supra note 161, at 4-5.
217. Id. at 4-5.
218. This situation conceivably could be created if circumstances, such as a prison riot
or a natural disaster, combine with a protracted strike to cause a significant threat to public
safety.
. 219. Under the NLRA, for example, a strike does not become an illegal activity simply
because it becomes protracted. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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Highways v. Public Employees' Craft Council that a strike by
public highway employees could not be enjoined is not an anomaly.
The public employees' right to strike, although an exception to the
longstanding common law rule, is well supported by Montana leg-
islative and administrative action, as well as by federal court and
NLRB interpretations of the NLRA.
The Montana public employees' right to strike can be charac-
terized as a broad right to engage in economic strikes. The other
ten state collective bargaining acts, with the exception of the Idaho
Employment of Firefighters Act and the Alaska Public Employ-
ment Relations Act, grant a more limited right to strike. Neverthe-
less, several clear limits to the Montana public employees' right to
strike exist, including those that apply to firefighters and nurses
which the legislature has treated separately because of the essen-
tial services these employees provide. A strike by any public em-
ployee union may be enjoined under the Montana Public Employ-
ees Collective Bargaining Act if it: (1) occurs during the term of an
agreement containing a no-strike clause, (2) is called in violation of
a notice provision in the collective bargaining agreement, or (3) vi-
olates an agreement to submit all bargaining disputes to final and
binding arbitration. Finally, strikes that involve or threaten vio-
lence or property damage (illegal activities) will meet the irrepara-
ble injury criteria under the Montana injunction statutes.
The Montana Act does not provide, as do nine other state col-
lective bargaining acts, for enjoining a legal public employee strike
by a finding that the strike is a clear and present danger to the
public health or welfare. The Montana Act is similar to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act in that it grants employees a broad
right to strike, limited in most cases only by illegal activities and
the parties' desires and economic strength. A public employee
strike after impasse resolution has failed and the existing contract
has expired should not be enjoinable given the statutory structure
Montana has adopted and followed. The granting of injunctions
based on criteria not contemplated or provided for under the Mon-
tana Act can effectively emasculate the Montana public employees'
well-established right to engage in economic strikes.
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